ODNI/DoD FY2024 Consolidated Annual Report on UAP

— p. 1 — UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ALL-DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE Fiscal Year 2024 Consolidated Annual Report on Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena Information Cut Off: June 1, 2024 — p. 2 — UNCLASSIFIED 1 UNCLASSIFIED Table of Contents I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................... 2 II. SCOPE .................................................................................................................................................... 2 III. OVERVIEW OF REPORTS .................................................................................................................. 4 A. Overall Trend Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 4 B. Diversification and Sources of Reporting ....................................................................................... 6 IV. OVERVIEW OF ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS .................................................................................. 7 A. Reported Morphologies .................................................................................................................... 7 B. Reported Altitudes ............................................................................................................................ 8 C. Geographic Trends ........................................................................................................................... 9 D. Notable Trends Regarding Prosaic Objects ................................................................................. 10 E. Flight Safety Issues .......................................................................................................................... 11 F. UAS Observations Reported Near U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure, Weapons, and Launch Sites 11 G. AARO Possesses No Data to Indicate the Capture or Exploitation of UAP .............................. 11 H. No Health/Physiological Impacts from UAP Incidents Reported............................................... 11 V. ENGAGEMENT, ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REPORTING ............................................. 12 A. Roles and Responsibilities of Assigned Line Organizations ........................................................ 12 B. Mechanism for Authorized Reporting .......................................................................................... 12 VI. AARO PROGRAM UPDATES .......................................................................................................... 13 A. Analytic Division ............................................................................................................................. 13 B. Operations Division ......................................................................................................................... 13 C. Science and Technology Division ................................................................................................... 13 D. Strategic Communications Division .............................................................................................. 14 VII. WAY FORWARD ............................................................................................................................. 15 APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF TERMS ................................................................................................ 16 — p. 3 — UNCLASSIFIED 2 UNCLASSIFIED I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report is provided by the Department of Defense (DoD) in response to a requirement established in 50 U.S. Code [U.S.C.] 3373(k). This report covers unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP) reports from May 1, 2023 to June 1, 2024 and all UAP reports from any previous time periods that were not included in an earlier report. The All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) received 757 UAP reports during this period; 485 of these reports featured UAP incidents that occurred during the reporting period. The remaining 272 reports featured UAP incidents that occurred between 2021 and 2022 but were not reported to AARO until this reporting period and consequently were not included in previous annual UAP reports. AARO resolved 118 cases during the reporting period, all of which resolved to prosaic objects such as various types of balloons, birds, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). As of May 31, 2024, AARO has an additional 174 cases queued for closure, pending a final review and Director’s approval. As of the publishing date of this report, all 174 cases have been finalized as resolved to prosaic objects including balloons, birds, UAS, satellites, and aircraft. Many other cases remain unresolved and AARO continues collection and analysis on that body of cases. It is important to underscore that, to date, AARO has discovered no evidence of extraterrestrial beings, activity, or technology. None of the reports AARO received during the reporting period indicated that observers suffered any adverse health effects. U.S. military aircrews provided two reports that identified flight safety concerns, and three reports described pilots being trailed or shadowed by UAP. To date, AARO has no indication or confirmation that these activities are attributable to foreign adversaries. AARO continues to coordinate with the Intelligence Community (IC) to identify whether these activities may be the result of foreign adversarial activities. AARO’s ability to resolve cases remains constrained by a lack of timely and actionable sensor data. AARO continues to address this challenge by working with military and technical partners to optimize sensor requirements, information-sharing processes, and the content of UAP reporting. AARO is also expanding engagement with foreign partners to share information and collaborate on best practices for resolving UAP cases. II. SCOPE This consolidated annual report is provided by the DoD in response to a requirement established in 50 U.S.C. § 3373(k)(1)(A): “Not later than 180 days after the enactment of the FY 2023 Intelligence Authorization Act and annually thereafter for four years, the Director of the Office shall submit a report on UAP to the appropriate congressional committees.” As detailed in 50 U.S.C. § 3373(k)(1)(B), “Each report shall include, with respect to the year covered by the report, the following information: — p. 4 — UNCLASSIFIED 3 UNCLASSIFIED • All reported UAP-related events that occurred during the one-year period; • All reported UAP-related events that occurred during a period other than that one- year period but were not included in an earlier report; • An analysis of data and intelligence received through each reported UAP-related event; • An analysis of data relating to UAP collected through: - Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) - Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) - Human Intelligence (HUMINT) - Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) • The number of reported incidents of UAP over restricted air space of the United States during the one-year period; - Including analysis of such incidents identified • Identification of potential aerospace and other threats posed by UAP to the national security of the United States; • An assessment of any activity regarding UAP that can be attributed to one or more adversarial foreign governments; • Identification of any incidents or patterns regarding UAP that indicate a potential adversarial foreign government may have achieved a breakthrough aerospace capability; • An update on the consultation by the United States with allies and partners on efforts to track, understand, and address UAP; • An update on any efforts underway on the ability to capture or exploit discovered UAP; • An assessment of any health-related effects for individuals that have encountered UAP; • The number of reported incidents or patterns, and descriptions thereof, of UAP associated with military nuclear assets, including strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships and submarines; • Results of consultation with the Administrator for Nuclear Security regarding the number of reported incidents, and description thereof, of UAP associated with facilities or assets associated with the production, transportation, or storage of nuclear weapons or components thereof; • Results of consultation with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of UAP or drones of unknown origin associated with nuclear power generating stations, nuclear fuel storage sites, or other sites or facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; • The names of the line organizations that have been designated to perform the specific functions including Response to and Field Investigations and Scientific, Technological, and Operational Analyses of Data on UAP, and the specific functions for which each such line organization has been assigned primary responsibility; and — p. 5 — UNCLASSIFIED 4 UNCLASSIFIED • A summary of the reports received using the mechanism for authorized reporting established under 50 U.S.C. § 3373b.” AARO drafted this report in coordination with: Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence ODNI’s National Intelligence Manager for and Security Military Integration (NIM-MIL) ODNI’s National Intelligence Council U.S. Army U.S. Navy (USN) U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) U.S. Air Force (USAF) U.S. Space Force (USSF) Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) DoD Joint Staff (JS) Department of Energy (DoE) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) National Aeronautics and Space National Air and Space Intelligence Center Administration (NASA) (NASIC) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) (NGA) National Oceanographic and Atmospheric National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Administration National Security Agency (NSA) Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Defense for Public Affairs Affairs Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Office of the General Counsel of the DoD Defense for Nuclear Matters Office of Naval Intelligence/National Office of the Principal Deputy Assistant Maritime Intelligence Center Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs III. OVERVIEW OF REPORTS A. Overall Trend Analysis As of October 24, 2024, there are 1652 reports in total. This report covers UAP reports from May 1, 2023 to June 1, 2024, and all UAP reports from any previous time periods that were not included in an earlier report. The All-domain Anomaly Resolution (AARO) received 757 UAP reports during this period; 485 of these reports featured UAP incidents that occurred during the reporting period. The remaining 272 reports occurred outside of the reporting period between 2021 and 2022 and consequently were not included in previous annual UAP reports. Of these reports, 708 occurred in the air domain, 49 occurred in the space domain, and none occurred in the maritime or transmedium domains (see Figure 1). AARO notes that none of the space domain reports originated from space-based sensors or assets; rather, all of these reports originated from military or commercial pilots or ground observers who reported UAP located at altitudes estimated at 100 kilometers or higher, consistent with U.S. Space Command’s — p. 6 — UNCLASSIFIED 5 UNCLASSIFIED (USSPACECOM) astrographic area of responsibility. Of the 757 reports 392 were from the FAA, which consisted of all of the FAA’s UAP reports since 2021. Figure 1: AARO Report Totals and Analytic Adjudications from May 1, 2023 – June 1, 2024 AARO resolved 49 cases during the reporting period, all of which resolved to prosaic objects such as various types of balloons, birds, and UAS (see Figure 2). An additional 243 cases were recommended for closure as of June 1, 2024, pending peer review. These cases also resolved to prosaic objects including balloons, birds, UAS, satellites, and aircraft. AARO determined 21 cases merit further analysis by its IC and science and technology (S&T) partners. Subsequent sections of this report include discussions of notable cases. The remaining 444 cases lacked sufficient data to facilitate analysis and were placed in the Active Archive where they will be held for pattern of life and trend analysis or reexamined if additional data becomes available. Archived cases may be reopened and resolved should additional information emerge to support analysis. None of these resolved cases substantiated advanced foreign adversarial capabilities or breakthrough aerospace technologies. AARO is working closely with its IC and S&T partners to understand and attribute the 21 cases received this reporting period that merit further analysis based on reported anomalous characteristics and/or behaviors. AARO will provide immediate notification to Congress should AARO identify that any cases indicate or involve a breakthrough foreign adversarial aerospace capability. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED — p. 7 — UNCLASSIFIED 6 UNCLASSIFIED Figure 2: AARO’s Closed Cases by Identified Object Type from May 1, 2023 – June 1, 2024 B. Diversification and Sources of Reporting AARO received the FAA’s civil and commercial aviation UAP reporting logs during this reporting period. These logs contained information on all UAP incidents reported to the FAA since June 2021. AARO consistently receives UAP reports from the FAA on a weekly basis, which is a significant increase from the previous reporting period and reflects the success of AARO’s efforts to strengthen relationships with its reporting partners. All of the UAP reports AARO received during the reporting period were collected through various technical means reported via U.S. military service operational channels, or civil/commercial aviation reporting logs provided by the FAA.1 Analysis of the data related to UAP is discussed in the following sections. During the reporting period, AARO did not receive any UAP reports collected through national GEOINT, SIGINT, or MASINT platforms. AARO will continue to strengthen IC partnerships to increase national reporting. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 1 Examples of this collection include full-motion video or radar data collected from U.S. military aircrews provided to AARO through operational channels via post-mission reports. — p. 8 — UNCLASSIFIED 7 UNCLASSIFIED • DoD and FAA reports are used to establish the baseline data for many case files. For instance, AARO relies on its IC partners to apply GEOINT tradecraft and analytic methodologies to full-motion video collected by U.S. military aircrews to identify UAP reported through operational channels. Additionally, as individual cases require, AARO searches IC databases for GEOINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, and MASINT reports to facilitate its analysis and resolution of cases reported through the sources identified above. IV. OVERVIEW OF ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS A. Reported Morphologies Reporting trends of UAP morphologies remain consistent with historical patterns. Unidentified lights and round/spherical/orb-shaped objects made up the bulk of cases in which reports provided distinct visual characteristics (see Figure 3). Objects within the “other” category include unique descriptions such as “green fire ball,” “a jelly fish with [multicolored] flashing lights,” and a “silver rocket approximately six feet long.” • Of the reports AARO received during the reporting period, 170 reports during the reporting period (22.4% of total) which contained insufficient or no information to enable a morphological characterization. — p. 9 — UNCLASSIFIED 8 UNCLASSIFIED Figure 3: UAP Characterization by Reported Morphology from May 1, 2023 – June 1, 2024 B. Reported Altitudes AARO observed no new trends regarding operating altitudes of reported UAP (See Figure 4). UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED — p. 10 — UNCLASSIFIED 9 UNCLASSIFIED Figure 4: Reported UAP Altitudes from May 1, 2023 – June 1, 2024 *Note that the table has been updated to reflect the boundary to space in feet (320,000) instead of kilometers (100,000). C. Geographic Trends AARO notes a continued geographic collection bias based on locations near U.S. military assets and sensors operating globally (see Figure 6). • During this reporting period, 81 reports originated from U.S. military operating areas. • U.S. military assets operating over the East Asian Seas provided 100 reports, and AARO resolved 40 of these cases as balloons or UAS. AARO placed the remaining cases in Active Archive due to insufficient information to facilitate analysis. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED — p. 11 — UNCLASSIFIED 10 UNCLASSIFIED • U.S. military assets deployed to the Middle East provided 57 reports, and AARO resolved 13 of these cases as balloons, UAS, or satellites. AARO reached a preliminary assessment on two of the Middle East cases as possible satellite flares and is working with IC and S&T partners to finalize these assessments through the use of advanced modeling. AARO placed the remaining 42 cases in Active Archive due to insufficient information to facilitate analysis. (U) Figure 6: Reported-UAP Hotspots May 1, 2023 – June 1, 2024 Figure 5: Geographic Distribution of UAP Reports from May 1, 2023 – June 1, 2024 D. Notable Trends Regarding Prosaic Objects AARO increasingly receives cases that it is able to resolve to the Starlink satellite constellation. For example, a commercial pilot reported white flashing lights in the night sky. The pilot did not report an altitude or speed, and no data or imagery was recorded. AARO assessed that this sighting of flashing lights correlated with a Starlink satellite launch from Cape Canaveral, Florida, the same evening about one hour prior to the sighting. This sighting occurred in the known orbital path of the satellites. AARO is investigating if other unresolved cases may be attributed to the expansion of the Starlink and other mega-constellations in low earth orbit. In many other cases, birds are commonly misidentified as UAP due to sensor artifacts resulting from compression and pixilation that often renders the object as an amorphous blob or orb. Electro-optical/infrared sensor glare can also cause distorted pixilation of the object’s true shape. Moreover, full-motion video (FMV) analysis, consistent with other confirmed examples of birds in flight, commonly display birds as “flickering” objects. This phenomena captured by FMV is indicative of flapping wings. UNCLASSSIFIED UNCLASSSIFIED — p. 12 — UNCLASSIFIED 11 UNCLASSIFIED E. Flight Safety Issues Of the 392 FAA reports received during the reporting period, only one report mentioned a possible flight safety issue during the event. In this instance, a commercial aircrew reported a near miss with a “cylindrical object” while over the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of New York. AARO continues its research into, and analysis of, this case. F. UAS Observations Reported Near U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure, Weapons, and Launch Sites Reports from the Administrator for Nuclear Security and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission AARO received a total of 18 reports from the Administrator for Nuclear Security and Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding incidents near U.S. nuclear infrastructure, weapons, and launch sites. The Administrator for Nuclear Security and Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission categorized all of these incidents as UAS. • Ten of the reported UAS flew over protected areas for a duration less than five minutes. Two instances involved longer flight times of 53 minutes and 1 hour and 57 minutes respectively. Flight duration is unknown for the remaining six cases. • Sixteen cases involved only one UAS, while the remaining two cases each reported two UAS involved in the event. In one instance, the UAS entered and departed the protected area twice. • On-site security observed UAS in at least half of the UAS cases. On August 3, 2023, the D.C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant security recovered a crashed UAS that was given to Berrien County, Michigan, local law enforcement (LLE). AARO has no further information about the crashed UAS. • During October 10-15, 2023, USPER BWXT (formerly known as USPER Babcock and Wilson Nuclear Energy) Fuel Cycle Facility in Lynchburg, Virginia, observed UAS flyovers for six consecutive nights. Only one UAS system was spotted in each occurrence, and there is no data on estimated flight duration for each occurrence. G. AARO Possesses No Data to Indicate the Capture or Exploitation of UAP AARO is working with mission partners to formalize a process in the event UAP materiel is captured, drawing on current USG capabilities and operating procedures. H. No Health/Physiological Impacts from UAP Incidents Reported AARO received no reports suggesting any observers of UAP suffered any physiological impacts or adverse health effects. The DoD acknowledges that health-related effects may manifest at any time after an event occurs, therefore any reported health implications related to UAP will be documented and reported if they emerge. — p. 13 — UNCLASSIFIED 12 UNCLASSIFIED V. ENGAGEMENT, ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REPORTING A. Roles and Responsibilities of Assigned Line Organizations Field Investigations and Ability to Respond In accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 3733(d), AARO executes a strategic partner engagement program conducting outreach and liaison activities. Components include the DoD, federal, tribal, state, and local law enforcement, counterintelligence (CI), and security agencies, as well as other Executive Branch entities and foreign partners in support of AARO’s UAP mission. AARO continues to work with the military Services, Combatant Commands, and others to support and refine their development of mitigation and response plans to include robust reporting processes. In May 2023, the Joint Staff (JS) issued a UAP GENADMIN message directing Combatant Commands and Services to report all UAP incidents, incursions, and engagements to Combatant Command Joint Operations Centers, Service Watch Centers, and respective CI elements, no later than 96 hours after the event. Scientific, Technological, and Operational Analyses of Data As designated by the SecDef and the DNI, AARO has partnered with the following organizations to leverage available resources and expertise and establish the scientific and technical foundation necessary to execute the AARO mission. • Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) provided analysis for a material claimed to be from a UAP. ORNL will continue to assist with any future physics-relevant case analysis. • The Air Force Research Laboratory provides research on air- and space-borne sensing technology and more general assessments of propulsion, stealth, and other emerging capabilities which may be operational in the next few years. • Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) developed the GREMLIN sensor architecture (described in additional detail on page 13) which will be deployed in 1Q FY 2025 to support pattern-of-life analysis. GTRI will continue to support sensor architecture analysis, development, and operations. • The Massachusetts Institute of Technology – Lincoln Laboratory is building prototype data processing systems that can operate on FAA and National Weather Service radar systems to determine the viability in detecting and tracking objects that are currently filtered out of the data. • NASA is the focal point for academic research and open source data analysis on UAP topics. B. Mechanism for Authorized Reporting On October 31, 2023, AARO launched the www.aaro.mil website, featuring a secure reporting mechanism for current or former U.S. Government (USG) employees, Service — p. 14 — UNCLASSIFIED 13 UNCLASSIFIED members, or contractors, who claim to have direct knowledge of purported USG programs or activities related to UAP, dating back to 1945, to contact AARO and submit a report. All information shared via this process is protected as personal and confidential and can generally only be shared with AARO staff for the purposes of contacting individuals for interviews. AARO is authorized by law to receive all UAP related information including any classified national security information involving military intelligence or intelligence related activities at all levels of classification, regardless of any restrictive access controls, special access controls, or compartmented special access programs. There is no restriction on AARO receiving any past or present UAP-related information, regardless of the organizational affiliation of the original classification authority within the Department, the IC or any other USG department or agency. VI. AARO PROGRAM UPDATES A. Analytic Division The majority of AARO’s case holdings remain unresolved due to a lack of data needed to further analysis. Without sufficient actionable data, these cases cannot be researched or analyzed. For the cases that merit further analysis, AARO continues to work closely with its IC, DoD, and S&T partners to facilitate additional collection and conduct analysis using advanced techniques such as modeling and simulation. B. Operations Division AARO continues to work with the Services, as the most critical executors in detecting, collecting, and reporting UAP. AARO also initiated USG working groups to address UAP in the space and maritime domains. C. Science and Technology Division AARO is developing an S&T plan that discusses how AARO is approaching the UAP problem set in a scientifically and technically rigorous manner, as described by 50 U.S.C. § 3733(g). The plan outlines the challenges facing UAP detection and identification such as a lack of high quality sensor data and a series of gaps in the scientific knowledge base. The plan presents a way forward on incorporate relevant sensor technologies, advanced data processing capabilities, and maturing the UAP-related sciences to minimize the identified challenges. AARO has begun collections using a prototype sensor system, GREMLIN, for detecting, tracking, and characterizing UAP. GREMLIN demonstrated functionality and successfully collected data during a test event in March of 2024. The next step for GREMLIN is a 90-day pattern of life collection at a site of national security. — p. 15 — UNCLASSIFIED 14 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSSIFIED Figure 6: The GREMLIN sensor suite contains several sensing modalities to detect, track, characterize and identify UAP in areas of interest. AARO S&T, in coordination with ORNL, wrote a report from the materials analysis of an alleged UAP and posted the analysis on AARO’s website. Future efforts include publishing requested supplemental data that further supports the report assessment. AARO S&T has published a number of educational reports identifying key artifacts that arise from sensors (to include parallax effect and Starlink flaring) producing performance characteristics of phenomena seeming to exceed state-of-the-art capabilities leading observers to perceive and report these sensor artifacts as anomalous phenomena. AARO S&T continues outreach across government, industry, and academia through multiple efforts, including participating in National Science Foundation sponsored workshops, speaking at conferences, and working with entities like the Office of Science and Technology Policy to explore ways to improve whole-of-government coordination activities. D. Strategic Communications Division AARO updates its public-facing website, www.aaro.mil, with declassified UAP data and footage, case resolutions, UAP analytic trends, and other information about its mission. AARO’s website also hosts the secure mechanism for authorized reporting of UAP programs or activities by current and former USG employees, Service members and contractors. In April 2024, AARO reengaged on its X account to share information and updates with the UAP community of interest on social media. UNCLASSSIFIED — p. 16 — UNCLASSIFIED 15 UNCLASSIFIED In March 2024, AARO released its unclassified Historical Record Report Volume I to the public via its website, and AARO’s Director briefed congressional oversight committees and the media to explain the report’s findings at the appropriate levels of classification. In accordance with the Department’s commitment to transparency on UAP matters, AARO also posted historical documents relating to KONA BLUE, a Prospective and not approved Special Access Program that was brought to AARO’s attention by interviewees who claimed that it was a sensitive Department of Homeland Security compartment to cover up the retrieval and exploitation of “non-human biologics.” In March 2024, AARO launched an “R-space” page for the cleared community and provides monthly updates on its work and findings up to the TS/SCI level to promote increased collaboration and information sharing related to UAP. In spring of 2024, the Department reviewed and approved its GENADMIN guidance on UAP reporting and materiel disposition for public release, which AARO has amplified on its website to promote increased awareness of how service members should report UAP sightings and also how best to handle and transfer all data or recovered material to AARO for analysis. VII. WAY FORWARD Airborne UAP continue to dominate UAP reporting with 708 of the 757 reports from this reporting period occurring in the air domain. The relationship between AARO and USAF, including the National Air and Space Intelligence Center and the Air Force Research Laboratory, continues to deepen and expand in terms of collection, analysis, exploitation, and resolution. AARO will continue to develop partnerships across the USG, academia, and commercial communities. Through these partnerships, AARO will expand its sensor technology capabilities, analytic tool suites, and the UAP-related sciences spanning the space, air, and maritime domains. AARO and NIM-MIL are strengthening targeted IC collection to mitigate reporting bias, increase reporting quality, and develop more comprehensive domain awareness. This partnership will help organizations focus on the information they should be seeking from UAP observers to provide valuable, complete reporting for subsequent analysis by AARO and its partners. — p. 17 — UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF TERMS Active Archive: Cases lacking sufficient data to facilitate analysis are placed in an archive where they will be held for pattern of life and for trend analysis or reexamined if additional data becomes available. Archived cases may be reopened and resolved should additional information emerge to support analysis. Airborne UAP: Sources of anomalous detections between Earth's mean sea level and the Karman Line. Maritime UAP: Sources of anomalous detections at or below Earth's mean sea level within a body of water. Spaceborne UAP: Sources of anomalous detections above the Karman Line (i.e., 100 kilometers above Earth's mean sea level). Transmedium UAP: Sources of anomalous detections that transit more than one domain. Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP): Sources of anomalous detections in one or more domain (i.e., airborne, maritime, spaceborne, and/or transmedium) that are not attributable to known actors and that demonstrate behaviors that are not readily understood by sensors or observers. “Anomalous detections” include but are not limited to phenomena that demonstrate apparent capabilities or material that exceed known performance envelopes. A UAP may consist of one or more unidentified anomalous objects and may persist over an extended period of time. UAP Attribution: The assessed natural or artificial source of the phenomenon and includes solar, weather, tidal events; U.S. Government, scientific, industry, and private activities; and foreign (allied or adversary) government, scientific, industry, and private activities. UAP Data: Any records of UAP detection, observation, identification, effects (on persons or equipment), mitigation, and material exploitation. UAP data includes but is not limited to: written notes, still photography and full-motion video, audio recordings, full- and partial- spectrum characterization, and digital records from observers, sensors, platforms, debriefers, and investigators. UAP Engagement: Bringing UAP under kinetic or non-kinetic fire, to deny, disrupt, or destroy the phenomenon and/or its object(s). UAP Incident: Any occurrence where UAP is detected by persons or sensors. UAP Incursion: Any UAP incident in, on, or near U.S. military installations, operating areas, training areas, special use airspace, proximity operations, and/or other national security areas of interest. Other areas of interest include but are not limited to U.S. critical infrastructure, IC installations and platforms, and national defense equities of military allies and intelligence coalitions (e.g., Five Eyes (FVEY)). 16 UNCLASSIFIED — p. 18 — UNCLASSIFIED 17 UNCLASSIFIED UAP Interrogation: The elicitation of UAP location, capabilities, characteristics, and/or intent using sensing capabilities including, but not limited to, electro-optical/imagery, infrared/thermal, radiofrequency/radar, light/laser (e.g., LIDAR/LADAR), electromagnetic means. UAP Objects and Material: Corporeal artifacts of UAP. UAP may contain one or more UAP objects (e.g., airborne craft exhibiting apparent anomalous capabilities). UAP material are samples, in whole or in part, of UAP objects (e.g., debris). UAP Risk: A safety hazard to persons, materiel, or information (e.g., from collision). UAP Threat: A force protection and/or national security threat to persons, materiel, or information by UAP that demonstrate hostile intent.